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Theory of Solvency Regulation in the Property and
Casualty Insurance Industry
Patricia Munch
Dennis Smallwood
The objective of this article is to examine the case for solvency regulation
of the property and casualty insurance industry and to examine the
effects of regulation in its current form. The case for solvency regulation
clearly derives from the difficulty of a policyholder in establishing the
financial soundness of alternative firms. But policyholders are not the
only parties concerned about the possibility of insolvency. A firm's owners
also lose; in fact, they lose their equity completely, whereas policyholders
and claimants may receive partial coverage. The insolvency risk is not
determined exogenously, but is a byproduct of conscious choices taken
to advance owner objectives. This study is motivated by the question:
Under what conditions are the interests of owners sufficient to provide
policyholders with an adequate level of protection?
Previous analyses have focused on two aspects of the problem: the
intrinsic risks in writing insurance, and managerial incompetence or
dishonesty. Analyses that focus on the intrinsic risks of the insurance
business concentrate on the statistical properties of the loss distributions
and on statistical-ruin problems. Taking the parameters of the loss
distributions as given, such studies attempt to determine the level of
surplus or reserves necessary to reduce the probability of insolvency to
some small arbitrarily chosen level. The implicit (sometimes explicit)
assumption is that insolvencies occur only because regulators have not
applied the sophisticated mathematical and computational tools that are
necessary to establish required capital requirements (see, for example,
Hammond et al. 1978; Hofflander 1969). It is confidently hoped that
improvements in regulatory skills can and should reduce or eliminate the
insolvency problem.
Those who stress the importance of managerial incompetence or
dishonesty (see McKinsey and Co. 1974) pin their hopes on more frequent
examinations, and better trained auditors. In this case, there is an implicit
assumption that a clear distinction exists between the behavior of firms
that become insolvent and honest, well-managed firms. We ignore prob-
lems of fraud and dishonesty not because we deny their existence, butMunch and Smallwood 120
because they constitute a different problem that is amenable to a different
type of analysis and regulatory response.
1
We adopt the position that both the underlying risks of the insurance
business and the behavior of management are important. We assume that
managers will accept those risks that maximize the value of the firm to
its owners. Thus, the underlying statistical properties of claims distribu-
tions and investment-returns distributions are relevant. But we reject the
presumption that the risks accepted by the firm are exogenous. Rather,
we assume that the risk of insolvency is selected by a management that
is competent but is not motivated to avoid all risks, at any cost.
The article thus focuses on the choices of the firm that implicitly
determine the probability of insolvency. An analysis of regulations to
reduce the likelihood of insolvencies must consider how such regulations
affect managerial decisions.
One-Period Model of an Insurance Firm
In this model, at the beginning of a given period the owners of a firm
provide financial "capital" equal to K. The firm then sets a premium rate
P and underwrites Q policyholders.
2 For simplicity, all claims and
other costs are incurred at the end of the period. The ith. policyholder
imposes a cost C, on the firm, which represents both the total claims cost
for the ith policyholder (including both claims payments and "loss
adjustment expenses") and the costs of writing and administering the
policy. Thus, Ct has a positive, nonrandom component, but we shall
nevertheless refer to Ct as the claims cost of the ith policyholder for
convenience. Fixed, overhead insurer costs are ignored. Thus, total insurer
costs, T, are
T=tct (1)
i = l
and we let C denote average realized claims cost per policyholder:
so that T= CQ.
Policyholders are assumed to have identical claims probability distri-
butions and to impose equal nonrandom costs on the insurer. Thus,
expected claims cost, denoted Ec, and the variance in claims cost, denoted
<jc, are equal for all policyholders:Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 121
E(Q = E(Cj) = Ec for all i,j, (3)
Var(Q) = Var(C,) = <rc = (Sc)
2 for all ij. (4)
Claims costs of different policyholders are not assumed to be inde-
pendent random variables. The pairwise correlation coefficient for any
two policyholders is assumed equal and is denoted by y:
Cov[Ci,Cy] = yac for all ij. (5)
The assumption that claims costs of different policyholders are not
independent implies that the variance per policyholder on "underwriting"
does not necessarily approach zero as the number of policyholders
increases, as is usually assumed. We demonstrate in appendix C (at the
end of the article) that this aspect of the model can be interpreted as
reflecting the firm's "uncertainty about the distribution of claims." That
is, allowing y # 0 widens the range of interpretation of the model to
include the case where the firm is uncertain about the parameters of the
claims distribution. While the firm may be expected to eventually infer
the parameters of a stable claims distribution, uncertainty may persist if
the claims environment is changing.
Since the firm obtains its capital and receives premiums at the beginning
of a period, but does not pay claims until the end of the period, it must
choose how to invest its funds during the period. We assume the investment
environment of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Within that
context, each investor chooses to divide his portfolio among a risk-free
security and various risky securities.
3 But equilibrium within the securities
market, which is attained after the price of each security has adjusted to
equate supply and demand for that security, is shown to imply that each
investor purchases the same combination of the available risky securities.
In effect, in equilibrium each investor owns a share of the entire market.
4
Thus, investor differences are reflected only in the division of their port-
folio between the "risk-free asset" and the "market asset," where the latter
contains all of the risky securities in the proportion to their total market
value.
5
At the beginning of the period, the firm has total investible funds equal
to K + PQ. Its second decision is to choose a, the proportion of these
funds that will be invested in the risky ("market") asset, which earns a
random rate of return Rm. The remaining proportion (1 — a) is placed
in the risk-free asset, which earns a certain rate of return equal to R{.
At the end of the period, the firm's total realized assets then equalMunch and Smallwood 122
(1 - a){K + PQ){\ + R{) + a(K + PQ)(1 + RJ
= [1 + (1 - a)R{ + aRm](K + PQ), (6)
where Rm is a random variable with expectation E(Rm), variance denoted
by am, and standard deviation denoted by Sm.
Claims costs are not assumed to be necessarily independent of the
return on the market asset.
6 We let am c denote the covariance between
the market rate of return and the claims cost of each policyholder, while
p denotes the corresponding correlation coefficient:
°m,c = Cov[tfm,Q] = pSmSc for all i. (7)
In the usual model of the insurance firm, risk relates only to the random-
ness in claims, which are assumed to be independent across policyholders.
Thus, the risk of insolvency becomes negligible as the number of policy-
holders becomes large, if the level of K per policyholder is held constant.
In this model, uncertainty about the firm's investment returns is intro-
duced, which does not become negligible as the firm increases in size.
Furthermore, the correlation of claims costs across different policyholders
—which can represent uncertainty about the probability distribution that
applies to claims—means that the variability of the average claim does
not necessarily become insignificant as the number of policyholders
increases. Thus, the model encompasses three sources of insolvency risk:
random claims variability, uncertainly about the parameters of the claims
distribution, and variability of investment returns.
Maximizing the Market Value of an Insurance Firm
Let \x denote the difference between the total assets and total liabilities
of the firm at the end of the period:
pi = [1+ (1 - a)R( + aRjiK + PQ) - (| cX (8)
where K is the initial capital of the firm, PQ is total premium revenue,
R( and Rm are rates of return on the risk-free and the market assets, and
Q is claims costs for the ith policyholder. Taking limited liability into
account, the net cash flow n
+ is as follows:
H
+ = Oif A« < 0
(9)
= niffi > 0.Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 123
Under the CAPM, the market value of the ownership rights to n
+, valued
at the beginning of the period, is
v+ =
where U represents total cash flow in the entire securities market and 6 is
a parameter determined by general equilibrium in the market. The term
involving the covariance of n
+ and U represents the market-determined
"penalty" for nondiversifiable risk.
7
The ultimate problem is to analyze which combinations of K, P, Q,
and a represent the firm's optimal choices with regard to market value,
with limited liability taken into account. However, in the context of
limited liability, the question of how to specify the demand relationship
arises. Although the assumption of perfect knowledge by applicants is
not an interesting context for examining solvency regulation, it would be
useful to understand optimal firm behavior in that context.
Since Q, P, K, and a all affect the likelihood of insolvency, we can
(conceptually) write demand as a function of these variables. Even beyond
the complexity introduced by having Q appear on the right-hand side of
the demand relationship Q = D(Q,P,K,tx), this specification is too general
to yield interesting results. Letting z represent the probability of insolvency,
can we simply write Q = D(P,z)l
In fact, specifying demand as a function of only P and z neglects the
possibility of partial claims recoveries. The condition n < 0 implies that
claims cannot all be fully paid, but only in the extreme case in which total
assets are zero at the end of the period will claims recoveries be zero.
Thus, the theoretically justified perfect-knowledge assumption is that
demand depends on the complete distributions of both final assets and
claims. In addition to its complexity, such a specification severely stretches
the perfect-knowledge assumption.
8
Since policyholders are neither perfectly informed nor totally ignorant,
the more relevant assumption would be that buyers are partially informed;
but to analyze market equilibrium and the effects of regulation with such
an assumption is extremely difficult.
9
An alternative is to assume that applicants use reasonably simple rules,
possibly involving proxies for financial solidity. But in that context,
a new issue arises: In the context of buyers who use simple rules or proxies
to estimate financial condition, firm value cannot be validly analyzed
within a one-period model. The basis of firm value becomes fundamentally
different. When applicants are assumed able to monitor all relevantMunch and Smallwood 124
parameters and infer their implications for claims outcomes, a firm has
no opportunity to build intangible capital. Any firm can enter the market,
set P, Q, K, and a, and sell to applicants who completely understand the
significance of these choices. For the perfectly informed applicant, a
firm's history—including whether it filed for bankruptcy in the previous
period—is irrelevant.
Within any context other than perfect knowledge, demand will generally
not be a function of only the current values of the parameters. In fact,
it is quite reasonable for partially informed applicants, who realize that
their inferences about financial condition are unreliable, to view proxies
such as the age and size of the firm, and even its advertising budget,
1
0
as indicators of financial solidity of the firm.*
 l But if two firms (in par-
ticular, an "old" firm and a "new" firm) that choose the same parameters
nevertheless face different demand curves, a source of "goodwill" or
"intangible capital" is created. Since a firm can be presumed to lose this
intangible capital in the event of insolvency, a one-period model does
not capture a crucial aspect of the problem. Since continuing access to the
firm's demand curve creates this value, a multiperiod model is required.
We analyze a multiperiod model below, but we are forced to simply
set a equal to zero. To gain some insight into the more general problem,
we analyze the case of unlimited liability in the remainder of this section.
Since policyholders are thus assured of total recovery of all claims, we may
assume that demand is a function of only the premium rate, Q = D{P).
The Case of Unlimited Liability
Under the assumptions that the firm's owners are subject to unlimited
liability and that they have assets adequate to cover all possible claims,
the net cash flow to owners at the end of the period is equal to JX, defined
in equation (8), without regard to its sign. Demand is then a function
only of the premium rate, Q = D (P). Within this context, we can analyze
the choices of Q and a that maximize market value. According to the
CAPM, the market value of the ownership of pL is
V = (—L-\[E(ii) - 0COV(AI,1/)]. (11)
V
1 +
 Ri)
Total market cash flow U includes the additional cash flow generated by
the insurance firm under consideration. However, the cash flows repre-
sented by the financial investment activity of the firm should obviously
not be doubly counted when defining U. Thus, we decompose p. into
two components:Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 125
pi = pi* + pi**, (12)
where
Rt){K + PQ) - (| cX (13)
pi** = oi(Rm - Rf)(K + PQ). (14)
Then pi* can be considered as the additional cash flow generated by the
firm,
1
2 while pi** represents the net cash flow to the firm as a result of
its investment in market securities. In other words, if we let M represent
all other flows of funds in the securities market at the end of the period,
we can write
U = M + pi*, (15)
where pi** is already included in M.
Thus, we can write
V = (—L-\{E(ri - 0Cov[ti,U]} (16)
V
1 +
 Rfj
—!—){E(pi* + pi**) - 0Cov[^* + jU**,M + /i*]}, (17)
1 +
 Rij
where M is independent of Q and a. Since £(•) and COV[] are linear,
we can write
V = V* + V**, (18)
where
V* = (--^){E(fi*) - 6Cov[pi*,M + pi*]}, (19)
V** = (—L-\{E{n**) - 0Cov|>**,M + ^*]}. (20)
V
1
 +
 RiJ
The total value of the firm is thus the sum of V* (which represents the
value placed by the market on ownership right to the additional funds
generated by the insurance firm) and V** (the additional value generated
by the investment activity of the firm).
For all Q and all a,
V** = 0 (21)Munch and Smallwood 126
(this is proved in appendix A). Since V* is independent of a, it follows that
the market value of the insurance firm is independent of a, the proportion
of investible funds placed in the market asset. The reason is that as the
firm increases a, the increase in expected earnings is exactly counter-
balanced by the penalty imposed by the market on nondiversifiable risk.
Since an increase in expected return can be obtained only by increasing
the covariance of fi with the market, the higher return on the investment
portfolio is exactly offset by the premium demanded by equity owners for
bearing additional risk.
Since V** is identically zero and V* is not a function of a, the value of
the firm is maximized when V* is maximized with respect to Q. Thus, we
can write the market value of the insurance firm as
V = V* = ( * )[E(fi*) - 9Cov(n*,M + //*)]. (22)
V
1 +
 Rfj
In appendix A, we evaluate E(fi*) and COV(^I*,M + /I*) and show that
(
1
 +
 Ri)(K
 +
 PQ)"
 QEc
- 0[-QVMamX + (1 + (Q - l)y)<2<7c]}, (23)
where VM represents the total market value of the ownership rights to M,
all other end-of-period flows of funds in the market. Taking partials with
respect to Q, the first-order condition for maximization of V is
(1 +
 R*)(j$) =
 Ec + °[-
VM°m,c + (1 + VQ ~ l)v)°cl (24)
We can more easily interpret this equation if we translate into different
parameters. The general equilibrium within the securities market which
is implied by the CAPM can be characterized in two ways. The first,
already noted, is a condition relating the value of an asset to the expected
value of its gross return \i and the covariance of the gross return with
the total flow of funds in the market, U:
V = (-J—\[E{ii) - 0Cov(/i,l/)]. (25)
Note that the market-determined parameter 9 varies with the scale of the
total market. An equivalent characterization of the asset market equilib-
rium can be written in terms of the rate of return on the y'th asset, Rj,Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 127
and the overall rate of return on the entire market, Rv. Equilibrium rates
of return satisfy the equation
E(Rj) = R( + ICovlRpRv]. (26)
The parameter X, sometimes termed the market risk premium, is equal
to
X = [E(RV) - RAlov, (27)
where av is the variance of K^.
1
3 The relationship between 6 and X is
X = 6VV, (28)
where Vv refers to the total value of all market assets. Hence, we can
rewrite the equilibrium condition as
The third term on the right-hand side reflects the increase in total market
variance due to the firm in question, and will be essentially zero for all
but very large firms. Similarly, we can take Vm/Vv « 1, except where the
firm represents a significant proportion of the total market.
Thus, we can summarize the conditions for maximization of the value
of the insurance firm, except where the variability of the firm's returns
represents a significant share of the total variance in the entire securities
market, as follows:
a irrelevant
maximize V
— Ec XamC
(30)
where V is the market value of the insurance firm, Q is the number of
policyholders it accepts at the premium rate P, a is the proportion of
investible funds placed in the (risky) market asset, R{ is the rate of return
on the risk-free asset, Ec is the expected claims costs per policyholder,
X is the market-determined risk premium, and omC is the covariance
between the market rate of return and claims costs.
Since dPQ/dQ is the marginal revenue from adding a policyholder,
equation (30) indicates simply that marginal revenue is equal to the
discounted value of expected claims cost plus a risk premium which
reflects the nondiversifiable component of claims costs. If we assume a
competitive insurance market, we can set marginal revenue equal to theMunch and Smallwood 128
premium rate and interpret (30) as determining the competitive premium
rate:
P =
 Ec'
Xl
mX- (3D
Let us consider first the case where claims costs and the market are
uncorrelated:
p = 0 => P = Ec/(1 + R{). (32)
Note that the competitive premium rate is equal to expected cost, per
policyholder, discounted at the risk-free rate of return. The fact that the
insurance firm can earn an expected rate of return higher than R{ by
investing part of its portfolio in the market portfolio does not affect the
competitive premium rate. The reason is that the higher return on the
investment portfolio must be passed on to equity owners as a return for
risk bearing. Exactly the same logic explains why the value of the firm is
independent of a.
This equation sheds some interesting light on the long-standing debate
over whether investment income should be included in formula for setting
premium rates. In a recent hearing on rate setting in Massachusetts,
the insurance commissioner argued that investment income should be
included in the ratemaking formula. He argued that using the return on
"the safest available asset, probably U.S. Treasury Securities, is the
minimum standard for investment results in any year .... The investment
results (of a company that invested only in risk-free bonds) provide a
minimum standard for the investment results of real companies. They
should on average over time be able to secure better investment returns
than the hypothetical company."
1
4 Equation (31) indicates that even if
higher investment returns are earned, they must be passed on to equity
owners as a return for risk bearing. Therefore, a premium level set on the
assumption of earning the minimum, risk-free rate of return should not
be viewed as an upper bound on the level necessary to ensure a competi-
tive rate of return to capital. On the other hand, the insurance firm also
does not get a "premium" for bearing the variance related to claims
fluctuations. With p = 0, claims variability is diversified away as the
shares of the firm become a trivial fraction of each investor's portfolio.
With p > 0, the competitive premium rate is reduced below Ecj(\ + R{),
because in that case underwriting income represents an asset with a return
that is negatively correlated with the rest of the market. With p > 0, the
insurance business is bad when the market is good, and vice versa; thusSolvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 129
the market puts a premium on holding insurance stocks which drives P
below Ec. With p < 0, the reverse applies and the competitive premium
rate is above Ec/(l + R{). But the effect of p on the competitive premium
rate has nothing to do with the opportunities for internal portfolio diver-
sification. It is relevant because of the external portfolio diversification
opportunities of the firm's owners.
Multiperiod Model with Limited Liability
In the last section, we addressed the problem of how an insurance firm
should choose a and Q so as to maximize its own market value. Since
the firm's owners were implicitly assumed to face unlimited liability, the
amount of invested capital was irrelevant; claimants were paid regardless
of the level of K. With limited liability, K becomes a crucial determinant
of the probability of insolvency, given the choices the firm makes with
regard to other variables. K is therefore a crucial determinant of potential
losses to both policyholders and shareholders. In this section we examine
the firm's choice of K in the context of limited liability.
Consider first the situation in which applicants are aware of each
firm's precise financial prospects. Then applicants will choose the level
of safety they prefer, taking the cost of greater safety into account. Where
policyholders are assumed to be capable of judging at zero cost the
probability of insolvency and its consequences, there are thus no apparent
benefits to regulation. Furthermore, an analysis of regulation for that
context, whether the regulations are justified or not, would strike most
as too unrealistic to be interesting.
In the opening section we discussed the difficulties of relaxing the
perfect knowledge assumption. Rather than attempting to propose an
"imperfect link" between the firm's choice of those parameters that affect
its financial condition and the demand for its policies, we consider the
case where demand for the firm's policies is unaffected by the firm's
choice of K. This is one method of specifying an insurance-market
environment in which applicants have great difficulty evaluating the
financial condition and the nature of the risks accepted by insurance
firms. It is also relevant to the case in which the policyholder is indifferent
to financial condition, either because there is a guaranty fund to com-
pensate the unpaid claimants of insolvent firms or because be purchased
(only to qualify as a financially responsible person) insurance covering
the liability claims of third parties.
Suppose we apply the assumption that demand for the firm's policiesMunch and Smallwood 130
is independent of K in the one-period context. Since neither marginal
revenue nor marginal cost is affected by K, the optimal choice for Q will
be independent of K.
15 Within a one-period context with the demand
curve given, the only function of K is to cover a greater proportion of
claims if total claims turn out to exceed total end-of-period assets. Thus,
within a one-period model, with limited liability and demand independent
of K, the firm will choose to set K as low as possible. If we impose a
constraint that Kmust be positive, we have a "one-cent insurance firm."
But in a multiperiod world, the insolvent firm loses the possibility of
earning profits in future periods. The market value of the firm will generally
be greater than its liquidation value at the beginning of the period, and,
if the firm does not go bankrupt, it will be greater than residual funds at
the end of the period. Owing to "goodwill" accumulated through previous
service, to simple habit on the part of policyholders, to irrational belief in
the solidity of the firm, or to any other phenomenon, the firm's owners
possess a stock of intangible capital which is lost in the event of insolvency.
We are able to capture this phenomenon by assuming that demand is
independent of the firm's choice of K; the firm's intangible capital relates
in our context to "access" to the assumed demand curve.
1
6
By providing a large amount of paid-in capital K, the firm can protect
its access to the market, and specifically its ability to exploit the demand
function Q(P). But the larger K is, the less advantage is limited liability
if claims turn out to be disastrously high. Thus, in the context of a multi-
period model, the question becomes: Which of two forces is stronger—
limited liability, which tends to reduce the optimal level of K to zero, or
the desire to protect intangible capital, which is lost when insolvency
occurs?
At the beginning of the period, the firm has paid-in capital K and access
to the demand function Q(P). Let V represent the market value of the
firm at the beginning of the period. We assume that paid-in capital K is
fully liquid at full value; thus, the liquidation value of the firm is K and
it must be that V > K. The difference V — K will be termed the intangible
capital of the firm and denoted W. Thus,
V = K + W, (33)
where V is the total value of the firm and W is its intangible capital.
At the end of the period, the firm has net assets of
li = [1 + xRm + (1 - a)*f] (K + PQ) - £ C... (34)Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 131
If pi > 0, then the ongoing firm retains its intangible capital W but its
tangible capital is now pi rather than K.
We assume that the firm is in a stationary environment. Thus, if pi > 0,
the firm continues to exist and is assumed to face the same demand curve
and claims environment at the beginning of the next period. Furthermore,
its owners are assumed to have the same investment environment.
1
7 If
pi < 0, the firm is insolvent, defaults on some proportion of its outstanding
claims, and loses access to the market. Let us then consider alternative
stationary policies, which can be defined thus: If pi > K at the end of the
period, the owners withdraw profits of pi — K;i(0 < pi < K, they provide
additional capital of K — pi.
After returning paid-in capital to the level K, the firm's choice environ-
ment is identical to that which existed at the beginning of the previous
period. Thus, it is obvious that its optimal choices of Q and a will be
unchanged from the previous period. Let Q(K) and <x(K) refer to the
optimal choices for Q and a, given that the firm intends to always return
paid-in capital to the level K as long as it remains solvent.
We can thus treat the firm as choosing from among alternative station-
ary policies {K,Q(K),oc(K)}.
18 Obviously the market value of the firm
will depend on the stationary policy chosen, and we can write V(K) to
represent the market value of a firm that adheres to such a stationary
policy, since K completely defines a stationary policy. With K allowed to
vary, clearly V(K) is not the variable that the firm's owners wish to
maximize. In fact, the firm's owners will want to continue adding capital
as long as the firm's market value increases by more than the addition.
That is, the owner's wealth will be maximized if the firm chooses the
policy that maximizes V(K) — K. If we continue to define "intangible
capital" as the difference between the market value of the firm and its
liquidation value, so that
V(K) = W(K) + K, (35)
then the optimal policy is to choose the {K,Q(K),a(K)} combination that
maximizes the intangible capital W{K) of the firm.
We therefore analyze the nature of W(K), which represents the intangi-
ble capital of a firm constrained to follow a stationary policy in which
invested capital is always reset equal to K as long as pi > 0. Let Y be
the market value of the firm at the end of the period, after claims are
paid but before capital is restored equal to K. If pi < 0, the firm is insolvent
and valueless. If pi > 0, then the ongoing firm retains its intangible
capital W(K) but its tangible capital is pi rather than K. Thus,Munch and Smallwood 132
7 = 0 if/i < 0
(36)
= W(K) + n if// > 0.
Applying the capital asset pricing model,
1
9 we can evaluate V(K):
(37)
The covariance term in (37) introduces great complexity, since 7 is
more likely to be zero if market returns are low. We have not been able
to analyze the general case. In order to impose the restriction
Cov(Y,C/) = 0 (38)
we must assume that claims and market returns are uncorrelated,
P = 0, (39)
and that the firm does not invest in the risky "market security,"
a = 0. (40)
Either p ^ 0 or a # 0 implies that Cov(7, U) # 0.
With the assumptions p = 0 and a = 0, we can write
2
0
V(K) = W(K) + K = L-1—\E{Y). (41)
Let S(K) represent the critical level for C (average realized claims), at
which the firm becomes insolvent:
5(K) = (K + PQ){\ + Rt)/Q, (42)
so that /i < 0 when C > 5. Then 7 = 0 when C > 5, and we can write
£(7) = E[fi + W(K)\C < S(K)~]. (43)
Let /(•) represent the probability density for C:
C ~ f(C). (44)
We can then write
£(7) = f \W{K) + (K + PQ)(1 + RJ - QC]f(C)dC. (45)
J —co
Let Fd be the probability that the firm becomes insolvent during any
single period:Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 133
p
Fd= f(C)d€, (46)
Jd(K)
and let Ed be expected claims costs, taking limited liability into account.
That is, Es equals expected claims costs, conditional on \i > 0:
E6= Cf(C)dC. (47)
J — co
Combining these definitions with (45), we can write
V{K) =
(K + PQ)(l + flf)](l - Fd) - QEd
Combining (41) and (48), we can solve for W(K):
W{K) = PQ(1 + *f)(l ~ Fd) - K(l + R{)Fd - QEd R{ + Fd
We now analyze the behavior of W(K) as K varies.
2
1 First, W(K) does
not grow beyond bound. Since Fd, the probability of insolvency, becomes
zero as K grows while Ed approaches Ec, it follows that
2
2
w{o0) = PQQ. + Rf) - QEC = (P(l + Rt) - EC)Q Rt R{
Clearly, W(co) represents the profits of P(l + R{) — Ec per policyholder
which are earned with certainty each period when K — oo.
We show in appendix B that if W(K) has a positive slope for K = Kx,
then it must have a positive slope for all K such that K > Kx,as long as
the distribution of average claims falls within a wide class of distributions
which include the range of plausible specifications.
2
3 It thus follows that
W{K) must follow one of the following four patterns:
Casel
W{K) decreases montonically toward W(co).
Case 2
W{K) decreases initially, then increases toward W(oo), with W(0) >
W(ao).
Case 3
W{K) decreases initially, then increases toward J'F(oo), with
W{oo).Munch and Smallwood 134
Case 4
W(K) increases monotonically toward
We illustrate these four cases in figure 3.1.
Consider the firm that is free to set K at any level. This exhaustive list
of cases indicates that an internal solution with 0 < K < oo never exists.
There are only two possibilities: When W(0) > W(oo), the firm will wish
to put no capital into the firm; when W{co) > W(0), intangible capital
W(K) can always be increased by adding more capital.
2
4
This result is not surprising; it reflects the competing desires to take
advantage of limited liability and to protect the intangible capital of the
firm. If the value of access to the market is too small, then the lure of limited
liability dominates. The optimal policy in that case is to continue in busi-
ness only as long as total claims are "favorable" (that is, C < P(l + R{))
and to "plan" to become insolvent in the first period in which total claims
are "unfavorable." Although the firm may have intangible capital as a
going concern, represented by W(co), the value of guarding it is less than
the potential value of taking advantage of limited liability.
When W{oo) > W{0), the optimal policy is to set K = oo. If the value
of access to the demand curve Q(P) is sufficiently great, then the addition
of capital, by increasing the expected longevity of the firm, increases the
market value of the firm by more than the value of the added capital.
But as the firm's owners supply more capital, the probability of insolvency
continues to fall and becomes negligible. As capital is added, the firm
looks more and more like an infinitely safe financial intermediary. The
"cost" of adding capital continues to fall. Within the assumptions of the
model, the value of the firm continues to increase by more than the value
of the added capital, and thus there is no finite solution for K.
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The absurdity of the "solution" K = oo reflects the limited realism of
the model. Various real-world considerations imply that the supply price
of capital to be added to firm reserves would eventually rise. The risk of
embezzlement, other fiducial risks, and the desire of investors to diversify
across different investment managers, would all act in that direction. But
the principle remains: The insurance firm with an incentive to add capital
and to drive the risk of insolvency to a low level can then continue to add
to reserves at a very low cost and thereby drive that risk to a negligible
value. Thus, when we refer to the "solution" K = oo, we refer to a situation
in which capital has been added until these problems of agency respon-
sibility dominate. If the "fiducial responsibility" risks are not great, as
would be expected for trusted managers, we can conclude that a "realistic"Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 135
Case 1
Case 2
Figure 3.1 Four possible shapes for W(K).Munch and Smallwood 136
Table 3.1 Illustrative values of £ and the corre-
sponding threshold for R{.
Z Rf = HO
0.000 0.000
0.025 0.032
0.039 0.050
0.050 0.064
0.075 0.097
0.077 0.100
0.100 0.131
0.114 0.150
0.149 0.200
0.150 0.201
0.200 0.274
0.250 0.350
0.300 0.430
0.400 0.598
0.500 0.780
solution for this case is characterized by a value for K large enough that
the probability of insolvency is negligible.
The ratio of W{oo) to W(0), thus, is a crucial determinant of firm
behavior with respect to K. We have been unable to obtain any perfectly
general results, but we have derived an interesting result for the case in
which average claims are assumed to be normally distributed.
2
6 Thus,
we now assume that C is normally distributed with mean Ec and standard
deviation S:
2
7
C ~ N(EC,SC). (51)
Let us express the premium rate, inflated at the risk-free rate of return,
in terms of Ec and Sc:
P(l + Rt) = Ec + £-Sc. (52)
Thus, if £ = 0.10, the inflated premium rate is 10 percent of one standard
deviation above the mean of the distribution of average claims.
We show in appendix B that the relationship between W(0) and W(oo)
depends only on £ and R{; specifically,
W(oo) for R{
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Table 3.2 Critical levels for [P(l + R{) - £C]/SC.
Q
With 5 = 0:
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
With 5 = 0.10:
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.0039
0.0077
0.0114
0.0149
0.0129
0.0254
0.0375
0.0493
100 1,000 10,000
0.0012 0.0004
0.0024 0.0008
0.0036 0.0011
0.0047 0.0015
0.0124 0.0124
0.0245 0.0244
0.0361 0.0359
0.0474 0.0472
where i// is a function which relates to the normal distribution.
2
8 Over
the interesting range, i//(£) is between 25 and 50 percent greater than £.
Illustrative values of i^(£) are shown in table 3.1. For £ = 0.10, i//(£) =
0.131. Thus, if the inflated premium P(l + Rf)is 10 percent of Sc above
Ec, then the critical value for Rf is 0.131. With Rf < 0.131, the firm will
want to place an infinite amount of capital in the firm, but if Rf > 0.131
the firm will want to withdraw all of its capital. Conversely, with R{ — 0.20,
the critical value for is £ is 0.149.
Since £ refers to the margin between the inflated premium rate and a
standard deviation of the average claims distribution, it appears clear
from table 3.1 that only a narrow margin is necessary for the firm to
protect its market access, for firms of even moderate size. In table 3.2,
for instance, we translate the implied margins into units in Sc rather than
in Sc. Thus we compute the critical level for [J°(l + R{) — £C]/SC above
which the firm will want to set K = oo, where Sc is a standard deviation
for the claims distribution of each policyholder, rather than for the average
claims distribution.
With d = 0, the critical margin between P(l + R{) and Ec is much
less than 1 percent of a standard deviation, unless the firm is very small
or the risk-free rate of return is very high.
2
9 Even with 100 policyholders
and R{ = 0.20, the critical level is only 1.5 percent of a standard deviation.
If we allow the claims of different policyholders to be correlated,
however, the critical margin increases significantly and the effect of firm
size is virtually eliminated. As noted above, the case of y =£ 0 can be
interpreted as reflecting uncertainty about the location of the claims
distribution. Table 3.2 also shows the margins with y = 0.10.
3
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margins then range from 1 percent to 5 percent and are affected only
slightly as Q ranges from 100 to 10,000 policyholders.
With the product QS is even moderately large (> 200), we can use the
following excellent approximation for the critical level £:
Rt) - Ec]/Sc « <^. (53)
Thus, even when 3 approaches 1 the critical margin does not exceed £.
When Rf = 0.20, the critical margin thus does not exceed 0.149, regardless
of the level of S and the source of the variation in the average claims
distribution.
Regulating Minimum Capital
We now consider the effect of regulating the level of paid-in capital.
Suppose the firm is constrained by a requirement that K > K. The effect
will depend on the behavior of W(K). In figure 3.2 we add a constraint
on K to the four cases we have identified. For case 3 and case 4, in which
W(oo) > W(0) and the unconstrained firm will choose K = oo, the
constraint is clearly not binding and the regulation will have no effect.
With case 1, in which W(K) is monotonically decreasing, the regulated
firm will clearly choose K = K, the constraint will be binding, and the
firm will choose to keep only as much capital as required by regulation.
Case 2 provides an interesting possibility. With K = Ku such that
W(KX) > W(co), the firm will choose to set K — Klt and the constraint
will be binding, just as with case 1. But suppose that K = K2, for which
W(K2) < W(co). In this case the optimal policy for the firm which is
required to have K > K2 is K — oo. Although the unconstrained firm
would choose to set K = 0, the constrained firm would choose K = oo.
It is thus of interest to determine when the different cases occur. Al-
though we have not found a simple characterization of the parameter com-
binations that produce the four cases, calculations of W(K) for a wide
range of parameter values show a consistent and plausible pattern. Cases
1,2,3, and 4 occur in that order as £ is increased from £, = 0, with the other
parameters held constant. Thus, if the claims distribution and the interest
rate Rf are held constant, the nature of W(K) is successively represented
by cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 as the inflated premium P(l + R() is increased from
expected claims cost Ec to larger values. Because Q is being held constant,
these calculations implicitly refer to a shifting demand curve, or, in a
competitive market, to an increasing competitive premium rate.
We demonstrate in appendix B that W(K)/Q is completely determined
by the parameters EC,SC, R{, £, and s, whereSolvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 139
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Figure 3.2 Imposing a minimum-capital constraint in the four cases.Munch and Smallwood 140
s = K/PQ.
Figure 3.3 shows W(K)/Q for values of s ranging from 0 to 0.20, with the
other parameters fixed at illustrative values. For this set of parameters,
the four cases occur as follows:
Case 1 £ = 0
Case 2 f = 0.025, 0.050, 0.075
Case 3 £ = 0.100, 0.150, 0.200
Case 4 £ = 0.50 (not shown on figure).
Over the range of parameters for which W(K)/Q was calculated,
3
1 the
same sequence for the four cases was followed consistently;
3
2 however,
we have no proof that it will hold for every parameter combination.
Insurer Behavior: A Partial Integration
In the preceding section we analyzed the firm's optimal policy with respect
to K, treating its choices of the premium (P) and the number of policy-
holders (Q) as given. We found that the firm's behavior with respect to
invested capital depends on the relationship among the premium rate, the
average claims distribution, and the risk-free rate of return. Suppose the
inflated premium rate is expressed in units that refer to the number of
standard deviations by which P(l + R{) lies above the mean of the
claims distribution. That is, let t, be defined such that
P(l +Rf) = Ec + £-SCt (54)
where Ec and Sc are the mean and the standard deviation of the distri-
bution of average claims costs. We find that if
< Rt (55)
then the unregulated firm will choose to set K = 0, but if
> Rf (56)
the firm will choose to set K = oo, where \j/(-) is a function derived from
the density function of the normal distribution.
3
3 Although the "solution"
K = oo is not literally acceptable, this case appears to be validly inter-
preted as a solution for which the probability of insolvency is reduced to
a negligible value and can be treated as essentially zero.
These results refer to the optimal choice for K with P and Q given,
with investment opportunities assumed irrelevant,
3
4 and with the demand40 r
5 20
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= 0.20
= 0.15
1 = 0.10
= 0.075
% = 0.05
= 0.025
0 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60
Figure 3.3 W(K)/Q as a function of s for different values of £, with Ec = 100, Sc = 20,
and R{ = 0.10.Munch and Smallwood 142
relationship P(Q) assumed independent of K. The issue arises: Which
combinations represent joint optima, under these conditions, when the
firm simultaneously maximizes with regard to P, Q, and Kl
Let W(P,Q,K) represent the net, or intangible, value of the firm.
35
The fundamental relationship
maximum W(P,Q,K) = maximum (maximum W(P,Q,K)} (57)
P,Q,K P,Q K
holds generally. However, as demonstrated in the preceding section, the
problem
maximize W(P,Q,K) (58)
K
results in a solution of either K = 0 or K = oo for all possible P and Q.
Thus, if we obtain solutions, subject to the constraint represented by the
demand relationship, for the two problems
maximize W(P,Q,O) (59)
P,Q
maximize W(P,<2, oo), (60)
P,Q
we can, in theory, find all joint equilibria by finding solutions that are
mutually consistent. That is, suppose we can find triples P*, Q*, K*
such that K* is optimal, given P* and Q*, while P* and Q* are optimal,
given K*. Such a combination represents a joint equilibrium and a local
optimum.
3
6 The global joint optimum must be one of these local joint
optima.
But the analysis for problem (60) has been done. When the firm sets
K = oo, limited liability obviously becomes irrelevant. Thus, the analysis
of the first section ("One-Period Model ..."), restricted to the case of
a = 0 and p = 0, applies. The optimal values for P and Q derived in
that section are independent of the value assumed for K; this follows
from the implicit assumption of unlimited liability. Clearly, if we now
assume that K is sufficiently large that limited liability is irrelevant, the
same solution results.
Under the restriction p = 0, and thus amC = 0, the optimal solution
obtained in the first section is simply the premium and policies-written
combination for which marginal revenue equals discounted expected
claims cost:
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Let P* and Q* represent the values that satisfy (61). Further, let £* denote
the corresponding value for £:
P*(l +Rf) = Ec + Z*-Sc. (62)
Then there are two cases to consider. Suppose first that, for this
combination,
HZ*) > Rt- (63)
Then it is clear that the combination [P*,Q*,K = oo] represents a local
joint optimum. The choices P* and Q* imply that K = oo is optimal,
while K — oo implies that P* and Q* are optimal. In this case the prob-
ability of insolvency is negligible and policyholders effectively enjoy
complete protection.
Now suppose instead that
W?) < Rt, (64)
so that, with P* and Q* given, the firm would choose K = 0. It does not
follow that the combination [P*,Q*,K = Qi] is a local optimum, since the
optimality of P* and Q* presumes unlimited liability. With K = 0, the
optimal choices for P and Q obviously must reflect limited liability.
Although we have not made a complete analysis of P** and Q**, the
optimal choices with K = 0, it must be true that
<A(£**) < Rt, (65)
where £** corresponds to p**.
3
7 Thus, in the case for which ^(£*) < Rf,
we know that some P** and Q** exist such that the combination
represents a global optimum for the simultaneous determination of all
three variables. Policyholders face a risk of insolvency. There is no bound
on the probability of insolvency, at least with the assumptions given.
A demand curve and a claims cost distribution could be defined for which
the firm would choose a probability of insolvency arbitrarily close to
unity.
For the case in which t/K£*) > R{, if does not necessarily follow that
the combination
is a global optimum, even though it is a local optimum. It may be that a
combination exists with K = 0 which dominates it. In essence, the firmMunch and Smallwood 144
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Figure 3.4 Equilibrium with Q* > Q.
has a choice of operating with the marginal-cost curve Ec with assured
survival, or of operating with a lower marginal-cost curve by setting
K = 0. Of course, by choosing the lower marginal-cost curve, it accepts
a lower probability of survival each period. Whether the local optimum
represented by P*, with K — oo, or the local optimum represented by
P**, with K = 0, represents a higher level for intangible capital depends
on the precise nature of the demand curve.
The different cases can be clarified diagrammatically. Limited liability
effectively reduces marginal expected policyholder costs, with the effect
on marginal cost becoming greater as Q increases and the probability of
insolvency grows.
3
8 In figure 3.4 we depict marginal expected policy-
holder cost with K = 0, labeling it E%, while using E% to label "full"
expected marginal cost,
3
9 corresponding to K = oo. We let Q correspond
to f such that
>A(<f) = (66)
so that the firm will choose to set K — oo if Q < Q, and will choose to
set K = OifQ > (5-
4
0 Thus, the expected-marginal-cost curve E£ applies
for Q < Q, while E°c applies for Q > Q.
The case in which Q* > Q, and thus tA(£*) < R{, is illustrated in
figure 3.4. It is clear that the solution for the one-period problem corres-
ponds to the point at which marginal revenue equals ££/(! + Rf). WeSolvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 145
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Figure 3.5 Alternative equilibria with Q* < Q.
use <2T* and Pf* to label the one-period solution. Note that Pf* could be
less than EQ ; in the case of limited liability, the firm could choose to
write policies below "full" expected costs.
But within a multiperiod context, the value of survival becomes relevant.
Decreasing P and increasing Q both decrease the probability of survival.
If P** denotes the optimal premium for the multiperiod case with K = 0,
it is clear that P** will be greater than p**.
4
1
Figure 3.5 illustrates the case for which Q* < Q and iA(£*) > -Kf- The
two possible one-period equilibria are indicated, and it is clear that the
global optimum will depend on the elasticity of the demand curve at
prices below P*. The relevant comparison, of course, is between \_P*,Q*,
X = oo] and [P**,Q**,K = Q]. If the demand curve is sufficiently elastic,
the profits expected to be made by increasing Q, setting K = 0, and
taking eventual advantage of limited liability dominate the value of
assured survival.
A global equilibrium with regard to the simultaneous choice of P, Q,
and K can thus be characterized by three possible cases. If iA(£*) < Rf,
it follows that the firm will choose to set K = 0 if it has complete dis-
cretion. It is possible that P may be chosen to be below Ec{\ + R().
Policyholders face a risk of insolvency which, at least given our assump-
tions, may be arbitrarily high. If a guaranty fund protects claimholders,
then the deficits are shifted to the industry as a whole.Munch and Smallwood 146
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If \j/(£*) > R{, then two cases are possible. It may be that P* and Q*,
as defined by (61) are optimal along with K = oo. But if the demand
curve is sufficiently elastic below P*, the firm may attain a still higher
market value by setting K = 0 and adjusting its premium and number of
policies written. We can prove that the choice for P will be below P*
and that the policies written will be greater than Q*.
Regulation and Minimum Required Capital
We can now consider the effect of regulating minimum K when P, Q, and
K are simultaneously chosen to maximize the net market value of the
firm. Obviously, in the case in which the optimal strategy for the firm
(in the unregulated context) is to set K = oo, imposing the requirement
K > K has no effect. Within the context of our assumptions, the costs
of regulation are entirely administrative and enforcement costs. Costs of
inefficiency that arise as firms adapt to regulations do not occur.
As we have demonstrated, the only alternative case is that in which
the unregulated firm would choose a combination \_P**,Q**,K = 0~]. We
saw above that when the constraint K > K is introduced, with P and Q
held constant, the firm may choose to set K = K or may choose to set
K = oo. When P and Q are allowed to vary, these same cases are possible.
Imposing a minimum capital requirement rotates the expected-marginal-
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case in which the unregulated firm would choose \_P**,Q**,K = 0] even
though i/K^*) > R{. For the one-period solution, the regulated firm clearly
might choose either [P*,Q*,K=oo~\ or the combination [P,Q,K—K].
Obviously, the same possibilities exist for the multiperiod case.
It is also clear that, for K large enough, the firm will choose \_P*,Q*,
A"=oo]. However, for the case in which i//(£*) < R{, the firm will never
choose to switch over to K = oo.
Thus, we can characterize the effects of regulation in terms of the two
basic cases. For i/^(£*) < R{, the unregulated firm will choose to set
K = 0. The regulated firm, which is required to set K > K, will choose
to set K = K. Furthermore, it will also respond by setting a higher
premium rate P and reducing the number of policies written. Thus, for
a firm that would choose to "exploit" limited liability, the imposition of
a minimum capital requirement reduces the level of risk accepted, in
addition to providing a cushion for those policies written.
For *A(£*) > R[, there are two possibilities. The unregulated firm may
choose to set K — oo. The unregulated firm would voluntarily choose to
be "infinitely safe," and regulations are neither necessary nor relevant.
The other possibility is that the unregulated firm would choose a com-
bination [P**,Q**,K = 0~\. If a small minimum capital requirement is
imposed, the firm will react as above: by setting K — K, raising the
premium rate, and reducing Q. However, for a sufficiently high K, the
firm will make a discontinuous jump to the combination \_P*,Q*,K = oo].
Thus, minimum capital requirements can generate "infinitely safe" firms
in some cases. But "infinitely safe" firms also may exist in the absence of
regulation, as a result of the desire to protect access to a profitable market.
Solvency Regulation: Repairing a Deficit
One aspect of the analysis requires clarification. We have assumed, in
the analysis of the case of limited liability, that the firm is faced with the
following possibilities: If total funds (j, at the end of the period exceed
total claims, the firm pays all claims, repairs capital to its beginning level,
and begins the next period; if total claims exceed total funds, then all
remaining funds are used to pay claims and the firm is then declared
insolvent.
This set of assumptions is consistent with the power of state insurance
commissioners to liquidate any firm whose capital and surplus falls below
the required level. But one important possibility is left out: the possibility
that the firm's owners will be given the opportunity to "resurrect" the
firm by adding capital at the end of the period. Clearly, "resurrection"Munch and Smallwood 148
may or may not be in the interests of the owners, depending on just how
large the deficit is.
Owners cannot be forced to repair a deficit, given limited liability. If
they are always allowed to repair a deficit, then the optimal strategy
with regard to invested capital, within this model, is obvious. With
demand totally insensitive to K, the firm will always choose to set K = K.
The only function of "excess" capital in that context is to pay a greater
proportion of claims in the event that claims are sufficiently high, in some
period when it is not worthwhile to salvage the firm.
This situation presents the regulator with a dilemma. The regulator
will always want to allow the owners to salvage the firm, ex post, if he
ignores the effect on future incentives. But if he always allows owners to
salvage when they wish, the incentive to provide the firm with more than
the minimum required capital disappears. On the other hand, the owners
are more likely to want to salvage the firm if they know they can choose
whether to salvage in the future. The firm is worth more if its owners
have a right to salvage.
Where other aspects of the cost of capital are ignored, as we have done
here, the answer seems clear. Since in our context the cost of capital
relates only to the uncertainty about claims variations, and becomes
negligible as the probability of insolvency becomes small, the regulator
should provide the incentive to set K = oo. But these other aspects of
the supply of capital impinge not only on the costs of existing and estab-
lished firms, but also on the difficulty of entry and on the startup costs
of new and young firms. The effects of solvency regulation seem to be
clearest with respect to the total supply of firms in the industry, rather
than with respect to insolvency rates (Munch and Smallwood 1980).
Thus, one should be cautious in drawing policy conclusions from the
analysis.
Summary and Conclusions
We first examine optimal firm choices in the context of unlimited liability.
We find that a, the proportion of initial funds invested in the risky asset,
does not affect the market value of the firm. Under the assumptions of
the CAPM, the insurance firm's owners are indifferent with regard to the
investment behavior of the insurance firm. Although the firm's expected
rate of return will be higher if it invests in the risky asset, the securities
market requires a compensating premium to the extent that the additional
risk is nondiversifiable.
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diversify away the variance in the firm's cash flow. The optimal P and Q
are defined by
(1 + Rf)MR = EC- Xam_c. (67)
That is, inflated
4
2 marginal revenue is equal to expected policyholder cost
plus a term representing compensation for nondiversifiable risk. For a
competitive market, we can interpret equation (67) as defining the com-
petitive premium rate. Thus, investment opportunties are relevant to the
level of competitive premiums, but the link involves the external invest-
ment opportunities of investors and will operate through the cost of
capital to the firm. The fact that the insurance firm can invest its capital
and reserve funds in assets which earn an expected return above R{ is
irrelevant to the optimal choice of P and Q (for a firm with market power)
and to the premium level in a competitive market.
It is important to note that the indifference of owners to the firm's
investment behavior is not based on an assumption of investor risk
neutrality. Within the CAPM, the community of investors are assumed
to be risk-averse, and they can be assumed to be risk-averse to an arbi-
trarily high degree. The point is that their own portfolio diversification
renders the investment behavior of the firm irrelevant.
These conclusions may be considered unrealistic, but it is important to
recognize the nature of the phenomenon that must be modeled to make
the analysis significantly more realistic. Three assumptions implicit in the
CAPM drive these conclusions. The first is that securities trading does
not involve transactions costs, in the sense that ownership may be trans-
ferred without cost. The second is that all potential investors share com-
mon information about the distribution of returns to all firms. The third
is that the returns of each firm are given, and implicitly that the behavior
of managers is thus also given and unaffected by changes in ownership.
Let us call these the problems of ownership transfer, information, and
agency, respectively.
Although the costs of ownership transfer clearly affect the small investor,
it seems implausible that the market value of firms would be highly
sensitive to such costs in a world in which the information and agency
problems did not exist. The existence of large traders and financial inter-
mediation would tend to eliminate its effect for all but very small firms.
Thus, to improve significantly on the CAPM analysis of market value,
particularly for the case of closely held firms we must address the informa-
tion and agency problems.
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and control when management is divorced from ownership. One might
presume that managers will want to minimize the possibility of insolvency,
but this depends on the nature of their remuneration and on their risk
aversion.
With regard to information, managers may well have a better under-
standing of the relationships among claims costs, returns on securities,
and the regulations specific to the forms in which reserves must be held.
Thus, the external portfolio management of owners may not be perfectly
substitutable for internal portfolio management, and the firm's investment
behavior may not be irrelevant to market value.
If the problems of agency and information were explicitly modeled, the
analytical results would quite likely be modified somewhat, particularly
for the closely held firm. But we still believe them to be first-order solutions
that are fundamentally correct.
Analysis of a firm's optimal choices in the context of limited liability
presents a fundamental problem: How should demand for the firm's
product be specified, given the possibility of insolvency? Since the case
of perfect knowledge is uninteresting, the problem becomes one of
specifying the response of partially informed buyers. But there is no
obvious and convincing method for specifying the relationship between
the firm's choices and the judgments that partially informed prospective
policyholders make about the solidity of the firm.
Rather than analyze some arbitrary specification of the link between
demand and the firm's choice for these variables, we analyze the case in
which demand is sensitive to only the premium rate. For the case in which
policyholders are protected by a guaranty fund providing claims coverage
when the insurer becomes insolvent, this seems the appropriate assump-
tion in any case. Where no guaranty fund exists, it is still useful to under-
stand the nature of firm behavior when demand is completely insensitive.
Even with demand taken as a function of only the premium rate, an
analysis of the joint determination of K, a, P, and Q in the context of
limited liability is complex, primarily because a one-period model is no
longer adequate. When buyers are less than perfectly informed, their
behavior and beliefs represent sources of intangible capital that is lost
when insolvency occurs. In our model, the firm's intangible capital relates
to access to the demand curve Q{P), which the firm is assumed to lose
when insolvency occurs.
Under a multiperiod model, market value is determined by the distri-
bution of returns and by the probability of survival each period. In order
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p = 0. Thus, the role of investment behavior is assumed away.
4
3 For the
case of limited liability, we consider only the firm's choices for K, P, and
Q-
The optimal choice for K (and thus the probability of survival) is
initially analyzed with a given distribution of returns (with P and Q fixed).
Market value is determined for alternative stationary policies in which
the owners reestablish K at a specific level each period as long as the firm
survives. The level of intangible capital, or market-value net of K, is
demonstrated to be a U-shaped function that monotonically approaches
an asymptote as K grows. This shape reflects two competing forces: a
high level for K ensures survival, whereas a low level allows the firm to
exploit limited liability in the event of large claims.
The optimal policy is thus found to consist of two extremes: The firm
should choose to set K = 0 or K = oo, depending on its profitability
and on the rate of interest. Specifically, let t, be the number of standard
deviations of the distribution of average claims cost by which the inflated
premium rate lies above expected average claims cost:
P(l + R{) = Ec + £SC. (68)
The optimal choice for K can then be characterized as follows:
(69)
K = oo o i//(£) > R{,
where (//(•) is a function that relates to the normal distribution.
4
4 Though
the "solution" K = oo cannot be accepted literally, it is based on a real
effect. As the firm adds capital and the probability of insolvency becomes
negligible, it essentially acts as a financial intermediary. The cost of holding
additional capital becomes correspondingly negligible, or at least no
greater than for other non-risk-bearing intermediaries. The policyholders,
of a firm that chooses K = oo receive complete protection against
insolvency.
In considering joint equilibria with respect to K, P, and Q, we let P*
and Q* represent the solutions corresponding to unlimited liability. Since
p = 0 by assumption, P* and Q* are the solutions to
MR = £c/(l + Rf) (70)
and we let £* denote the corresponding value for £:
P*(l + Rf) = EC + £*SC. (71)Munch and Smallwood 152
There are three cases to consider:
Case 1 iA(£*) < R{.
Case 2 <A(£*) > Rf, and the unregulated firm will choose to set
K = oo.
Case 3 *fr(€*) > R(, and the unregulated firm will choose to set
K = 0.
In case 1 the unregulated firm will choose to set K = 0 and will choose
a corresponding P** and Q**. With the requirement K > £ imposed on
it, the firm will be led to set K = K, raise its premium, and lower the
number of policies written. As K is increased the probability of insolvency
continues to fall, but it remains positive.
In case 2 regulation is obviously unnecessary. The unregulated firm
chooses to be perfectly safe. Although monitoring costs exist, imposing a
minimum capital requirement does not create costs of adjustment. In
particular, imposing the requirement has no effect on P and Q.
In case 3 the firm behaves as in case 1 for low K, but at a certain level
for K the firm responds discountinuously and switches over to K = oo.
Sufficiently high minimum capital requirements will induce the firm to
forsake the advantage of limited liability and add capital to the point
where it is essentially perfectly safe.
These results suggest a schizophrenic regulatory environment. At least
within the context of an insensitive demand curve, some firms are led
to pursue an ultrasafe strategy. In that case solvency regulation, in the
form of minimum levels for K, is unnecessary. But the results also imply
that such regulation is costless, at least in the sense that it would not alter
firm behavior, and thus inefficiencies will not arise as the firm adapts.
For firms that would choose to set K = 0, regulatory constraints on
minimum K will obviously have an effect. In some cases a firm that would
choose K = 0 in the absence of regulation will choose to set K = oo
when required to set K > K\
What do the results imply for regulatory policy? Just as the results are
somewhat paradoxical, so the implications may depend on how one views
the different conclusions we derive.
"Completely safe" firms may arise naturally in a context in which
applicants have only primitive notions of how to discriminate among
firms, and use simple rules to try to attain safety. Not only are astute
applicants not needed for safe firms to arise; indeed, it is the existence of
applicants who rely on simple rules that creates the intangible capital
that encourages the firm to protect its existence.Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 153
Thus, one can argue that regulation may not be needed in exactly the
situation where it appears most clearly justified: where applicants are
largely oblivious of the details of firms' financial structures and rely on
simple proxies to provide them with safety. Suppose applicants generally
divide firms into old or established firms and new or unknown firms. If
applicants treat "old" firms as "safe" and are willing to pay a premium
for safety, this creates the intangible capital that leads the firm to want
to protect its position and to set K = oo. The belief that old firms are
safe becomes self-fulfilling.
If there a sufficient supply of firms viewed as old, the premiums of old
firms will still be driven down to a competitive level but the competitive
level will reflect the full costs of effectively unlimited liability. Those
applicants who want safety can buy safety, and the market will provide
it. Those applicants who are willing to rely on their own judgment and
who may be willing to accept some nontrivial risk of insolvency are free
to go to new or unknown firms. As long as all applicants understand that
they have a choice of buying from an old firm or of relying on their own
evaluations of the safety of a new firm, the case for regulation seems to
degenerate to ensuring the protection of applicants who put more faith
in their ability to judge firms than is warranted. Solvency regulation, in
this view, protects not the naive but the arrogant.
But this conclusion assumes that the market position of each of the
old firms is sufficiently profitable to protect by setting K = oo. If the
profitability of an old firm is too low, to the point where the incentives
of limited liability come to dominate the value of protecting its position,
then those applicants who are willing to pay for safety will be unwittingly
exploited.
What conditions might lead to the profitability of old firms dropping to
the point where it is not worthwhile to protect the intangible capital
inherent in the perception that the firm is old and reliable? It is important
to note that the threat of excess capacity is essentially absent; the amount
of specific physical capital in the insurance industry is negligible. Marginal
and average costs vary little, and firms can contract from an level of
extended "production" with few problems. Indeed, the ease with which
insurance firms can contract has produced some of the dissatisfaction
with the insurance market's performance in recent years.
Clearly, rate regulation is one possibility. Forcing rates below long-run
full cost levels could eliminate the desire to protect one's market access.
Indeed, firms have been required, against their desires, to stay in some
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because these have been multiline firms for which the insurance line at
issue represents only a proportion of their business, and because only
one or a few states were exploiting this leverage.
Similarly, while technical change and structural innovation can disrupt
the position of "old" firms, the insurance product is basically fixed,
although methods of packaging and selling the product undergo significant
changes. But methods differ considerably across different lines—particu-
larly between personal and commercial lines—and structural changes
have tended to affect old, established firms in only one or a few lines at
any time.
Thus, to the extent that "old" firms, which sell (at least in part) to those
who seek essentially complete safety, are highly diversified across different
lines, the likelihood that conditions in different lines would simultaneously
deteriorate to the point where an insolvency would dominate the selective
exit from some markets seems very low.
4
5 Obviously, if several state
regulators were to keep rates below full-cost levels in several lines this
conclusion would be in jeopardy.
Another factor that destroys this line of argument is the existence of
guaranty funds, which reimburse those who have claims against insolvent
firms. If applicants are aware of guaranty funds and believe they provide
perfect protection against a partial claim recovery, all reason for concern
with their insurer's financial condition disappears. Indeed, applicants will
not simply be indifferent between firms with different financial policies;
those firms that set K = 0 will be able to sell at a lower premium than
those setting K — oo. In both cases policyholders will have complete
protection. The existence of a perfect guaranty fund allows policyholders
to share in the benefits of limited liability without incurring any of the
costs.
It would seem that the existence of a perfect
4
6 and understood guaranty
fund should destroy an insurance market. Each firm would choose K = 0.
Applicants would choose the lowest premium available. Thus, as appli-
cants were added, their full expected costs would be added to the industry's
expected costs but not to the firms underwriting them. As firms became
insolvent the liabilities of surviving firms would grow, and presumably the
expected costs of new entrants would increase as the unpaid liabilities
grew. A type of externality would exist, in that a firm would impose
expected costs on its competitors as it wrote more applicants.
The inevitable result seems clearly pathological. As firms become
insolvent, their liabilities are spread over existing firms in proportion to
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which new entrants would wait until all surviving firms had gone under.
Thus, the existence of a guaranty fund creates the need for financial
regulation. However, it should be noted that financial regulation only
modifies the problem created when applicants have no incentive to avoid
financially risky firms. According to the model we have analyzed, firms
will choose to set K = K, the probability of insolvency will be positive,
and the "externalities" problem will still exist.
Although the existence of a guaranty fund destroys the rationale for
protecting a firm's existence which we have modeled here, other factors
also generate intangible capital. All firms incur startup costs and fixed
costs in becoming established. Furthermore, writing an individual policy
has fixed costs which are recouped only as the policyholder continues to
renew. Thus, being an established firm has value even if applicants are
indifferent to all firm attributes except premium rate. A sufficiently large
capital requirement will produce the case where the value of survival
dominates the advantages of limited liability, and firms will choose to
become perfectly safe in the face of financial regulations.
Thus, the combination of a guaranty fund and financial regulations may
produce a viable insurance market in which policyholders have perfect
protection against insolvency. However, this result may have substantial
costs, particularly as it affects the vigor of competition in the market.
Firms which service those willing to trade off premium costs against the
risk of partial claims recovery are eliminated. If all firms were equally
efficient and if competition among "old" firms were vigorous, this cost
would seem likely to be slight. The lower premium offered by some firms,
such as in cases 2 and 3 above, would be lower only because limited
liability lowers expected costs. For a risk-averse individual who buys
insurance to provide compensation in the event of some catastrophe, it
seems evident that a lower premium would not be attractive if the cost
saving related to some probability of a partial or zero claim payment.
Suppose, however, that competition among "old" firms is not as
vigorous as it could be, and that in a world of perfect ability to judge
firms' financial conditions premiums would be lower. Suppose further that
old firms do not always innovate quickly as new insurance needs appear.
Then some individuals, while risk-averse, will want to buy insurance from
new firms—either because they have confidence in their ability to judge
financial condition and have faith in certain new and unestablished firms,
or because they have unusual insurance needs to which the established
firms are not responding and are willing to accept some probability ofMunch and Smallwood 156
insolvency in order to obtain a product more suited to their needs. Both
situations appear to have existed in recent years.
In this case, the effect of financial regulations on entry and on the vigor
of competition in the industry must be considered. As we show elsewhere
(Munch and Smallwood 1980), the effects of solvency regulation seem to
be clearest with respect to the total supply of firms in the industry rather
than with respect to insolvency rates. As discussed in that paper, financial
regulations offer opportunities for abuse by a regulator who accepts the
position that competition in the industry should be stifled.
The danger that financial regulations may protect policyholders from
competition rather than from unrecognized risks is particularly clear in
commercial lines. When firms find it difficult to join and form their own
insurance pools to cover product liability, or when groups of professionals
cannot establish new facilities for providing malpractice coverage, there
is obviously a question as to who benefits from the regulations. The
necessity for financial regulations across all lines to ensure solvency, and
the existence of guaranty funds, should be evaluated critically.
Appendix A
Let M be total market flows at the end of the period in the absence of
the insurance firm in question. The value VM of ownership of rights to
Mis
T/ _ E{M) - 9Cov(M,M) _ E(M) - 0Var(M)
y — — M
1 + Rt I +
according to the capital asset pricing model. We can treat the introduction
of the firm in two steps. First, the additional cash flow represented by the
additional firm:
fi* = (1 + R{)(K + PQ) - £ Q
i=l
is added to total end-of-period market flows:
U = M + fj*.
The value of 6 and all asset values must adjust, and we have
_ E(U) - 6*Cov(U,U)
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since an infinite supply of a risk-free asset with rate of return R{ is assumed.
Thus, for a specific cash flow Dj, we have
_ E(Dj) - 9* Cov(Dj, U)
V°i ~ 1 +*r '
The insurance firm now invests a proportion a of its funds in a balanced
portfolio which represents the total market (including the firm in question).
The net end-of-period cash flow arising from the investment is
H** = txiRu - R()(K + PQ),
where Vv{\ + Rv) = U by definition. Let d denote the fraction of the
total market which the firm has purchased. Thus, we have
<z(K + PQ) = dVv
at the beginning of the period, and
<x(l + RV)(K + PQ) = dU
at the end. Therefore,
H** = a(l + RV)(K + PQ) - a(l + Rf)(K + PQ)
= dU - d{\ + R{)VV,
so that
E(fi**) = dE{U) - d{\ + Rf)Vv,
Cov(n**,U) = Cov(dU,U) = dCov(U,U).
Hence,
r«* = dE{U) - d(\ + R{)VV - 9*dCov(U,U)
1 + R(
E(U) - 9*Cov(U,U)
l+R{
= 0.
To compute V*, the market value of the rights to pi*, we use
E(ii*) = (1 + Rt){K + PQ) - QEC.
Since (1 + R()(K + PQ) is constant, it follows thatMunch and Smallwood 158
Q Q
= Cov - X Q, M - X
= -tcov(C,,M) f
because
Cov(C,,M) = Cov(C4,(l + RJ VM)
= VMCov(CitRJ-
Appendix B
In the third section we derived
W(K) = (1 + - QEa
From the definitions of S(K), Fd, and Ed, it follows that
iF _ Sf(5)
dK
5~ Q '
since only K is treated as variable in that section. If we multiply both sides
above by Rf + Fd and differentiating with respect to K, it follows that
where
MK) =
is a function of K that is always positive, if f{5) > 0 for all K.
For an average claim distribution that is a normal distribution, or
approximately normal, the ratio F5/f(8) is monotonically decreasing. TheSolvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 159
class of distributions for which this ratio is monotonically decreasing are
known as the increasing-failure-rate distributions in the literature of
statistical reliability theory. These distributions, which include the gamma
Gx a distributions with a > 1, the truncated normal distribution, and the
X
2 distributions, provide approximately normal distributions which are
non-negative and have thick upper tails, and are therefore appealing as
a claims distribution for a firm with a finite number of policyholders.
Thus, our results certainly do not depend on less appealing aspects of
assuming a normal distribution.
Suppose that, at K = Kr, W(K) has a positive slope. Then, since
W{K)/Q is growing while Fd/f(d) is falling, the slope will continue to be
positive for K2 > KY. Thus, it follows that
dW
dK
> 0
dW
K = K, dK
> 0 for K2 > Kx.
We now indicate how W(K )/Q can be written in terms of standardized
parameters, assuming that average claims C have a normal distribution
C ~ N(Ec,(Scn
so
t = (C - Ec)/Sc ~ N(0,l).
For the normal distribution, we have
Ed = Ec(i - r(Z)) - Sc(<i>(Z)).
With the definition of S(K), we have
W(K) =
- QEd
Rt)PQ-8-FyQ -QEd
so
W(K) = (l + Rf)P-5-F3-Es
Q R{ + Fd
Since
P(l +R{) = EC + fSc,
we can use the expressions for EC,SC, and S(K) to obtainMunch and Smallwood 160
W(K) = [$ - ZT(Z)
Q Rt + r(Z)
Since Z(0) = £, we have
Q Rf
As # approaches infinity, Z(K) also approaches infinity while ZF(Z) and
4>{Z) approach zero, so
from which it follows that
W{oo) > W(0) ifR{ <
Let Z correspond to S(K), the value of average claims below which the
firm is insolvent:
Z(K) = [5(K) - Ec]/Sc.
If we let </>(•) represent the density function for the standard normal, it
follows that
f(C)
and
dC =
so
=
= <l>(t)/Sc
(Sc)dt,
f
+0° _ _
f(C)dC
Jd(K)
1 4>{t)dt
poo
JZ(K)
r(z),
where 1 — F(Z) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal random variable. Similarly, integrating Es by parts leads toSolvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 161
_ _ _
Ed= Cf(C)dC — oo
= Ec(l - Fd) + (SC) | t<Kt)dt.
Because
4
7
z
we have
E3 = Ec{\ - F5) - SC4>{Z).
Last, we show that P** > P**, where P** and Pf* are the multi-
period and one-period solutions, respectively, for the case in which P and
Q are allowed to vary, with K fixed at zero. Differentiating W with respect
to <2 produces
because
BE,
Since P** occurs at a point at which
0
d<2
and since W > 0 and
it follows that P** occurs at a point where
and thus that P** > P * *, if marginal revenue is monotonically decreasing.Munch and Smallwood 162
Appendix C
Let Cl,...,CQ be identically distributed with a common mean /ic. We
conceptualize a model in which (ic is first determined randomly, which
then defines the joint distribution of the C,. Let £M refer to expectations
taken with respect to the distribution that produces fic, let Ec/Il refer to
the conditional expectations of the Cj given fic, and let E refer to the un-
conditional expectations which reflect the combined stochastic processes.
Then fic has first moment
EMc) = fic
and second moment
Var^c) = v
2,
while the conditional moments of the Cj are
Cow a^C^RJiXc) = pSmSc.
Our purpose is to compute the unconditional moments, which show
that we can make the model implicitly reflect "uncertainly about /ic" by
appropriately specifying the assumed parameters. The mean fxc is assumed
to be distributed independently of both the Cj and RM. Letting * denote
unconditional moments, we have
lit = E(Cj)
= E[(Ct - /ic)
2]
= E[(Q - nc + He ~ fic)
2]
nc)(iic - iic) + (nc - flc)
2]
2}Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 163
— E^yoc + (fic — fic) \
= <TC + V
2.
It similarly follows that
Cov*(C,,C,) = Co y(Ci,Cj) + D
2,
Cov*(ChRJ = Cov(Q,JRJ.
Thus, we can write
He = fic,
a* — ac + v
2,
Cov*(Q, Cj) = S*G* = Cov(d, Cj) + v
2 = foe +
Cov*(d,RJ = S*SmP* = CovlCKJ = ScSmp.
Therefore,
(5* =
aC
5o
while
Thus, if there is uncertainty about the true mean, the effect on the relevant
moments is that the claims variance ac is increased (a* > GC) by an
amount equal to the variance of the uncertain mean, and the pairwise
correlation of claims is increased (S* > d; note that 5* is a weighted
average of S and 1), while the correlation between each claim and theMunch and Smallwood 164
market rate of return is decreased in absolute value (\p*\ < \p\, since
In particular, note that claims may be uncorrelated, given the mean
(8 = 0), but that uncertainty about the mean of the claims distribution
(u
2 > 0) implies that the overall correlation among claims is positive
(8* > 0 if d — 0) and is then equal to the ratio of the variance of the
mean to the total unconditional variance.
Notes
1. The McKinsey study of 101 insolvencies of life companies and 129 insolvencies of
property-liability companies found dishonesty to be the primary cause of insolvency much
more frequently for life companies (77 percent) than for property-liability companies (34
percent). The principal cause (59 percent) of property-liability insolvencies has been under-
writing losses.
2. The firm is not able to distinguish between better and poorer risks in the relevant popu-
lation, and thus there is no active policyholder selection.
3. The "riskless asset" may represent bonds with essentially zero default risk, such as
government bonds. The impossibility of hedging perfectly against inflation is ignored.
4. This conclusion depends on the assumption of zero transactions costs in the securities
market. We comment on the relevance of the CAPM framework below.
5. Throughout the analysis we ignore the effect of the firm in question on the distribution
of Rm. However, we do not ignore its impact on total flows of funds in the market at the
end of the period, as will be clear below.
6. The correlation between the market asset and claims costs can reflect various phenomena,
such as the effect of unanticipated inflation on both claims and the market asset. Similarly,
it is widely believed that OPEC price increases affected both the stock market and gasoline
consumption and thus automobile insurance claims.
7. That is, to the extent that variations in fi
+ are correlated with U, they cannot be effectively
"diversified away" as all investors devote an insignificant proportion of their portfolios
to the ownership of this firm.
8. Note that assumed knowledge must include parameters which reflect the firm's un-
certainty about the location of the claims distribution.
9. Furthermore, the results depend critically on assumptions made about the nature of
the partial ignorance, about the awareness of buyers of their limitations and their response
to it, and about the behavior of firms in such a context and their ability or willingness to
exploit buyer behavior.
10. If the returns from advertising are not entirely exhausted in the current period, a firm
that advertises extensively can be assumed not to expect immediate dissolution, ceteris
paribus.
11. Indeed, we show below that such behavior tends to be self-fulfulling: To the extent
that demand is insensitive to current choices, firms will have the incentive to become very
safe.
12. The capital asset pricing model implicitly presumes an infinitely elastic supply of the
risk-free security; our inclusion of K as a cash flow thus has no effect on the conclusions.Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 165
Treating /J* as a new flow into the market assumes that the writings of other insurance
firms remain unchanged as the firm in question changes its premium rate.
13. The parameter /.is often defined alternatively &s[E(Rv) — R^/Sv, with a corresponding
adjustment in the equilibrium equation.
14. "Rate of Return & Profit Provision in Automobile Insurance," State Rating Bureau,
Division of Insurance.
15. Assuming that the firm chooses to stay in business; we discuss this possibility briefly
below.
16. Also involved is the implicit assumption that after insolvency the firm cannot be resur-
rected and write policies according to the given demand curve.
17. Of course, the firm's past experience will affect the investment environment of its
owners by changing their wealth; we ignore this effect.
18. It is clear that the overall optimal policy for the firm is a stationary policy.
19. The CAPM is essentially a one-period model. However, it can be applied by noting
that Y represents the net cash flow of an owner who sells his interest in the firm at the end
of the period, after claims have occurred but before paid-in capital has been restored.
20. Equation (41) could alternatively be obtained by assuming that all investors are risk-
neutral. However, the CAPM conclusions are obtained on the assumption that investors
are risk-averse, to an unspecified degree. Equation (41) follows not from risk-neutrality,
but rather from the assumption that investors can costlessly diversify their own portfolios.
21. In analyzing the behavior of W{K), we treat Q as fixed, ignoring the dependence of
Q(K). This assumption is relaxed in the fourth section.
22. The product K- F$ approaches zero for any distribution.
23. This conclusion can be derived for the increasing failure rate distributions, which
include both the truncated normal and other approximately normal distributions that are
non-negative and have thick upper tails, and are thus appealing as assumed claims dis-
tributions for a firm with a finite number of policyholders.
24. For simplicity of exposition, we ignore the case ^(0) = W(oo), in which the firm is
perfectly indifferent between K = 0 and K = oc.
25. Of course, the change in V(K) — K becomes trivially small as K becomes large.
26. The distribution of C must approach a normal distribution as Q increases, by the central
limit theorem.
27. In terms of the previously defined parameters, (Sc)
2 = [1 + (Q — l)y](Sc)
2/Q.
28. (//(£) = £Z(0/O(£) - £Z(<D], where <H£) is the density function of the standard
normal distribution and Z(£) is the probability that a standard normal random variable
is greater than £,.
29. Rf represents the real risk-free rate of return.
30. The case y = 0.10 can be interpreted as a claims environment in which 10 percent of
the total variance in the distribution of individual policyholder claims is attributable to
uncertainty about the location of the distribution (that is, uncertainty about the location
of the mean) and 90 percent represents the variation of claims about the true mean.
31. The range includes Ec = 100.0; Sc = 20.0, 30.0; Rf = 0.03, 0.06, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20;
I = 0, 0.025, 0.050, 0.075, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.50, 1.0, 2.0; b = 0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, ..., 0.95,
1.0.
32. However, the specific values of ^ for which the different cases appear vary.Munch and Smallwood 166
33. Although Q (the number of policyholders), does not appear explicitly, it affects Sc.
34. That is, it was assumed both that a = 0 and that p = 0; these assumptions continue
to be maintained in this section.
35. As in the third section, the firm's owners clearly will not wish to maximize total market
value V(P,Q,K) with K variable, but net market value W(P,Q,K) = V(P,Q,K) - K.
36. It may be that if P, Q, and K are allowed to vary simultaneously, a still better position
could be found. The combination [P,Q,K~\ that represents the best possible simultaneous
choice of all three variables is the global optimum.
37. The combination [P**,Q**,K=0~} dominates [P*,Q*,K=0] (because P** and Q**
are optimal with K = 0), which dominates [P*,C*,K= oo] (because )//(£*) < Rf), which
dominates [P**,Q**,K=oo] (because P* and Q* are optimal with K= oo). Thus, if
[P**,Q**,K=oo] dominated [P**,Q**,K=G\, one would have a mutually inconsistent
chain, as in an Escher drawing.
38. Marginal expected policyholder cost is the mean of the claims cost distribution that
has been truncated at the point at which insolvency occurs. As Q is increased, the truncation
point falls.
39. Thus, EQ corresponds to Ec.
40. One can prove that £ falls monotonically as Q increases over the relevant range. Multi-
plication of equation (54) by Q, differentiation with respect to Q, and manipulation leads to
d£_ _ (1 + R()MR - Ec _ J_
SQ ~ SCJQ 2Q
for the case y = 0. It is simple to then show that monotonicity continues to hold for y > 0.
41. Proof that P** > Pf* is given in appendix B. However, it is not obvious that P**
will be lower than P*. Intuitively, it seems that the influence of limited liability, which
reduced the optimal premium rate, should dominate the influence of the survival motive;
after all, we are considering the case where, at the premium rate P*, the firm chooses to
set K = 0. But we have no proof for this conjecture.
42. (Because premiums are received at the beginning of the period while claims are paid
at the end.)
43. Given the assumption p = 0, the CAPM equation for market value collapses down to
the sum of discounted expected net profits, adjusted for the probabilities of survival. As
above, this result is not based on an assumption that investors are risk-neutral, but rather
reflects their opportunities for portfolio diversification.
44. The conclusions that the optimal K is either K = 0 or K = oo is obtained by assuming
that average claims costs follow an increasing risk probability distribution, which includes
both the normal and related distributions that span the range of plausible distributions.
The characterization (69) assumes that the distribution of average claims costs is normal.
45. Geico is highly specialized to automobile insurance.
46. As opposed to a fund that provides only partial compensation, or provides compensation
with a significant lag, or with significant associated hassle.
47. We thank Gus Haggstrom for pointing this out.Solvency Regulation in the Insurance Industry 167
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Howard Kunreuther
In this interesting and stimulating paper Munch and Smallwood raise
the following question: Does solvency regulation of the casualty insurance
industry produce sufficient benefits in the form of consumer and owner
protection to justify the operating and monitoring costs of such a system?
The authors appropriately note that consumers may be imperfectly
informed about the financial stability of different companies. Two
empirical studies support their point by shedding additional light on
the imperfect information consumers have been obtaining on insurance.
J. D. Cummins et al. ("Consumer Attitudes Toward Auto and Home-
owners Insurance," Wharton School Department of Insurance report)
found in a field survey of 2,462 individuals who purchased automobile
and/or homeowners coverage that few compared the policy terms from
different companies before making their purchase decision. Similar be-
havior was found by Kunreuther et al. (Disaster Insurance Protection:
Public Policy Lessons [New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1978]) in a field
survey of 3,000 homeowners residing in flood- and earthquake-prone
areas. This study revealed that most homeowners were either unaware
of terms in their policies or had misinformation on such relevant data as
premiums and deductibles. If consumers are reluctant to collect data
on these characteristics, which directly affect them, it is unlikely that
they have information on the financial quality of the company. The
latter information would require detailed reading of balance sheets and
perhaps inside information on recent company performance and strategy.
The above empirical findings raise a question of whether the capital
assets pricing model (CAPM) is an appropriate model for describing an
insurance firm's behavior. If companies know that consumers have
limited interest in collecting detailed information on insurance and hence
have imperfect data on policy terms, then their behavior and marketing
strategies are likely to differ from actions they would take if they assumed
that consumers collected detailed information and expected them to try
to maximize utility. There is no way to answer specifically the question
of what assumptions firms are making about consumer behavior unless
we undertake more detailed empirical analyses. However, on a theoretical
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behavior by postulating that the consumer has limited and imperfect
information on characteristics of the insurance market.
The interesting work Munch and Smallwood have undertaken on the
CAPM can be used as a starting point for determining whether alternative
models produce significantly different results in insurance companies'
behavior. In particular, one should then be able to discover whether
different assumptions about consumer behavior will affect the actions of
firms in a way that influences bankruptcy possibilities.
Let me turn now to the model Munch and Smallwood investigate.
To make their multiperiod analysis tractable from a mathematical point
of view, the authors make the following simplified assumptions regarding
consumer and firm behavior:
• that consumers are indifferent to the financial condition of the firm,
either because they have imperfect information, because they are
protected through a guaranty fund, or because they buy insurance solely
to satisfy responsibility requirements; and
• that firms do not invest in risky market securities.
As a result of these assumptions, a firm should choose to set its financial
capital (K) equal to either 0 or oo. The choice of either extreme is deter-
mined by the relative advantages of minimizing the liability should the
firm go bankrupt {K = 0) and of reducing the probability of bankruptcy
to a negligible level (K = oo). The reason for this dichotomous policy is
that the firm, if it exists, faces the same demand curve and claims policy
as in the previous period.
To make the model more realistic and interesting, Munch and
Smallwood might want to view consumer demand as a function of both
the premium and the perceived financial stability of the firm as represented
by K. One way to do this in the spirit of their analysis is to divide consumers
into old customers (who continue to purchase a policy from the firm
with which they started, independent of its financial stability) and new
customers (who may be sensitive to the financial condition of firms in
making their choice, but can misperceive this information). In each
period, a fraction of old customers leave the market and another fraction
of new customers enter. In this case the firm will have to concern itself
with the impact that K has on demand so that the optimal value may be
somewhere between 0 and oo. This paper discusses a special case of this
more general model: New customers do not exist, so demand is solely
a function of the premium (P).
The performance of several other regulatory systems, aside from
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the context of the broader model proposed above. They might want to
investigate the performance of a policy where K is a function of the
number of policyholders (Q). Such a policy may be more desirable than
specification of a fixed K if the variance of the claims distribution, and
hence the probability of bankruptcy, were assumed to change with Q.
Another alternative the authors might want to investigate would be
to have the regulatory commissioner specify a minimum level of capital,
K, below which a firm would have to undertake special steps to avoid
bankruptcy. These could include raising additional capital from outside
sources or reducing the number of policyholders in future periods (for
example, by not renewing all policies). Under such a system, K serves
the same function as safety stock in inventory systems where the firm
faces uncertain future demand. The minimum capital requirement would
then directly affect the future probability of bankruptcy by forcing the
firm to pay special attention to factors that affect it directly.
As Munch and Smallwood indicated in an earlier version of this paper,
a variant of this system is in operation in some states which require a
minimum capital requirement (K) and an additional surplus requirement
(S). Once a firm's assets fall below K + S, it is forced to take special
steps such as adding to reserves. By developing a theoretical analysis
of this problem, Munch and Smallwood could address the implications of
such a system for firm behavior and insolvency probabilities. Admittedly
there are monitoring problems associated with measuring surplus, as the
authors pointed out, and these costs would have to be included in an
evaluation of such a regulatory policy. A more detailed discussion can
be found in A. L. Mayerson's "Ensuring the Solvency of Property and
Liability Insurance Companies," in Insurance, Government and Social
Policy, ed. S. L. Kimball and H. S. Denenberg (Homewood, 111.: Irwin,
1969).
In an earlier version of this paper, the authors provided empirical
evidence on insolvencies which indicates that failures are more common
among firms writing automobile insurance than engaging in commercial
lines. On the basis of this evidence the authors conclude that these data
are consistent with the hypothesis that insolvencies may be caused by
poorly informed purchasers of auto coverage.
Empirical evidence from a study by D. Olson (Insolvencies Among Auto-
mobile Insurers [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1970]) suggests a different interpretation of why insolvencies have
occurred in the automobile insurance market. In recent years many
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automobile insurance as a condition for a license. (A financial responsi-
bility law requires a driver who has caused an accident to show proof
of ability to pay the loss, either through an insurance policy or by posting
bond.) These structural changes naturally expanded the demand for
insurance. During this same period many leading companies felt that
automobile rates were inadequate, and hence were reluctant to renew
existing policies let alone to extend market coverage to new customers.
This gap between supply and demand led many new firms to enter the
automobile insurance market. Olson cites detailed empirical evidence
indicating that most auto-insurer insolvencies were due to "intentional
management ineptness bordering on fraudulent behavior rather than on
impersonal market forces" (p. 43). If newly formed companies were
intentionally engaging in such behavior, they would be more likely to
enter states where there was no minimum capital requirement.
Another factor that may have caused insolvencies in the automobile
market is the difficulty firms may have had in determining risks on which
their premiums were based. Olson indicates that expenses for automobile
claims are not restricted to a single year, because individuals may be
able to collect today on injuries from accidents that occurred in past
years. Hence, premiums may not be easily determined by looking at
the past claims distribution. The problem of setting economically variable
rates is exacerbated by state regulatory agencies which restrict proposed
rate increases by companies.
The difficulty firms have in estimating future losses provides an
additional reason for instituting minimum capital requirements. If firms
are unable to determine the mean and variance of their future claims
from past data, then their decisions on optimal premiums and policy-
holders may be based on incorrect information. Minimum capital
requirements may then serve the useful function of encouraging the
entry of larger firms, which may be in a better position than smaller
companies to absorb unexpected losses.
The authors may also want to investigate the impact of a requirement
proposed by P. Joskow ("Cartels, Competition, and Regulation in the
Property/Liability Insurance Industry," Bell Journal of Economics 4:
275-326) that all firms be required to carry complete insurance against
bankruptcy, with rates varying directly with their premium/capital ratio.
Such a requirement should reinforce minimum capital requirements in
protecting firms and consumers against their own actions based on
imperfect information.
The Munch-Smallwood paper is an interesting first step in addressingKunreuther 172
policy questions related to the impact of financial regulation on insol-
vency. Before one advocates specific recommendations, further work
should be undertaken to relate the decision processes of consumers and
firms to the institutional arrangements currently in force. Such research
may then lead to more definitive answers to the general question about
the desirability of regulation posed at the beginning of the paper.Comment
Michael P. Lynch
Regulations that are designed to "insure" insurance-company solvency
may have an important impact on the entire insurance industry, yet they
have received very little attention from economists from either a theo-
retical or an empirical point of view. Munch and Smallwood provide a
welcome first step toward a theory of the economics of solvency regulation
by asking why an unregulated market will not automatically produce the
efficient level of solvency and by proposing a model to answer this
question. Their model is designed to apply to the casualty-and-property
segment of the insurance industry, but it is worth noting that solvency
regulation figures prominently in the $30-billion-a-year life insurance
business. For example, a well-known textbook (D. McGill, Life Insurance,
revised edition [Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1976]) states the following
(p. 776):
The primary purpose of state insurance regulation is to maintain the
solvency and financial soundness of the companies providing insurance
protection. In states having large domestic insurers the amount of effort
expended in the supervision of the insurers' affairs exceeds that involved
in all other kinds of supervisory work combined.
This emphasis on solvency regulation exists despite the rarity of in-
solvencies among life insurance companies and the even greater rarity of
consumers being hurt by insolvency. (Equity Funding was a case of
defrauding stockholders, not policyholders.)
Solvency regulations that include minimum capital or surplus require-
ments, restrictions on portfolio composition, reserve requirements, and
asset-valuation requirements may have an important impact on the level
and structure of life insurance prices. Indeed, these regulations may be
an important cause of the poor rate of return on the savings element
offered by life insurance relative to banks, savings and loan associations,
and other financial intermediaries. Though it is difficult to find consumers
who have been hurt by firms becoming insolvent, it is not at all difficult
to find consumers who have paid higher than necessary amounts for
their insurance coverage from highly solvent firms. These considerations
suggest that there is a tradeoff between increased solvency and increasedLynch 174
prices and that, at least in life insurance, the optimal insolvency rate
may be higher than the one currently observed.
Another problem worth exploring is the reasons for the regulations
in the first place. Who demanded them? Consumers? Reformers? The
industry itself? The first two seem unlikely. I will suggest that the industry
itself demanded these regulations, and that the benefits derived are subtle
and cannot be measured in terms of reduced insolvencies.
Let me turn now to the theoretical analysis in the Munch-Smallwood
article. As a first step in analyzing the costs and benefits of regulation,
the authors quite appropriately ask how the probability of insolvency
would be determined in an unregulated market. The owners of an
insurance company, as well as its policy holders, have an interest in the
company's solvency. Under some circumstances, at least, there may be
no need for solvency regulation, since the owners will have the proper
incentives to choose the "optimal" probability of solvency. The capital
assets pricing model (CAPM), at first glance, appears to provide an
attractive framework for analyzing this problem. It seems as though
this model can be used to solve for the amount of paid-in capital; the
number of policies to be sold; and the proportion of the firm's assets
to be invested in risky assets rather than in the (elusive) riskless asset,
which maximize the market value of the firm. Since solvency regulations
commonly specify some minimum paid-in capital and impose restrictions
on how much of a company's assets may be invested in certain "risky"
assets, the CAPM seems to provide a convenient framework for the
analysis. I believe that, in this case, appearences are deceptive.
The CAPM is a theory of how a given set of risk-averse investors value
a given set of risky earning streams. It assumes that investors have full
information on the probability distributions of these risky earnings
streams and that they can and will bear unlimited liability for them.
It is basically a theory of the demand for risky assets. Equilibrium prices
are obtained by assuming that there is a fixed supply of risky assets,
which must be held. The model is not useful for the problem at hand,
for the following reasons:
• It focuses on the behavior of the investors in an insurance company,
whereas the focus should be on the policy holders. It is the possibility
that the insurance company may not pay valid claims, and the impact of
this possibility on the demand for its product, that makes insurance-
company insolvency special. As Munch and Smallwood point out, the
unlimited-liability assumption rules out the problem of insolvency from
the policyholders' point of view. They attempt to drop this assumption,
but at the cost of assuming that investors are risk-neutral and thatComment on Munch and Smallwood 175
policyholders are indifferent to the level of paid-in capital. These
assumptions appear to me to rule out any meaningful analysis of
policyholder concern about insolvency.
• Contrary to appearances, the basic CAPM does not have any
interesting implications for the optimal level of paid-in capital or the
optimal mix of risky and riskless assets. The model determines a value
for each asset. The current value of ^dollars is simply # dollars. The
current value of each insurance policy, the random variable P — C,, is
the discounted value (at the riskless rate of return) of the expected
difference between the premium and the claim cost minus the market
price of risk times the undiversifible risk between the policy and the
total set of risky assets (including the policy itself). The market value of
the "company" is simply the sum of the value of its assets. The value of
the "firm" appears to be independent of the particular owners' choice of
oc, just as the value of the CAPM "firm" is independent of the owner's
choice of a debt-equity ratio (the famous proposition 1 of F. Modigliani
and M. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the
Theory of Investment," American Economic Review XLVIII [1958]:
261-297; for a proof that this proposition holds in the CAPM see
J. Lintner, "The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky
Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets," Review of
Economics and Statistics XLVII [1965]: 13-37). The risk preferences of
the initial owners influence the value of the firm only insofar as they
influence the market price of risk. In equilibrium, all investors who hold
any risky assets at all hold some risky insurance assets. That is, all risky
investors are "owners" of the insurance firm.
• As far as determining the optimal number of policyholders, the
Munch-Smallwood analysis is at least incomplete and perhaps mistaken.
Every time a new policy is underwritten, a new random variable is
added on the supply side of the market. This requires that a new
equilibrium set of values be determined. This may result in a change in
the equilibrium value of the "market price of risk" and a change in the
total value of the universe of risky assets in the market. Munch and
Smallwood implicitly assume that the market price of risk is
independent of the number of policies written. Were this so, then the
market value of each new policy would be the same as each old policy,
at least in the special case where the insurance claim variables are
assumed to be independent of all other risky assets in the market. If it
was worthwhile to write one policy, then it would be worthwhile to
write an indefinite number of policies; that is, the market value of the
firm would increase without limit as the number of policyholders
increased.
• As may be obvious from the above, I do not think the model has
"interesting implications" concerning the proper treatment of
investment income for insurance ratemaking purposes. The complexities
of the investment income problem arise more from the difficulty ofLynch 176
determining how much of the income derives from policyholders'
capital rather than investors' capital than from determining the proper
risk-adjusted rate of return for stockholders.
The CAPM does not seem to provide a useful framework for the
analysis of insurance company solvency. I shall sketch an alternative
model that may prove helpful. I start from the assumption that it is not
the problem of the investors that makes an insurance company's possible
insolvency special—indeed the problem doesn't arise for a large portion
of the business which is sold through mutual companies. It is the effect
of the possibility of insolvency on the policyholder that makes insurance
company insolvency special and has led to the special regulations. The
belief in the mind of a potential policyholder that the company may
fail fundamentally alters the product that the company is trying to sell;
that is, the fear of insolvency may greatly change the demand for the
product.
Let us take the simplest case. A risk-averse individual is subject to
a loss of C with probability p. He can purchase a full-coverage insurance
policy for a premium kpC, where k > 1 and represents the "loading"
in the policy. The figure portrays how this individual can be made better
off so long as he can obtain an insurance policy with a loading between
1 and k*, where the latter depends on his degree of risk aversion.
The situation changes radically if the consumer believes there is some
probability s that the firm will be unable to pay off on a claim. The
consumer can no longer pay a small amount to rid himself of large
uncertain loss. He is still subject to the uncertain large loss, and, in
addition, to the certain small premium payment. Graphically (see figure),
this means that he trades a point on one line segment (such as I) for
another point on another segment (for example, III) instead of trading
a risky situation (I) for a riskless situation (II). This means that, for any
given loading, the insurance is worth less to the individual than in the
no-insolvency case, and for any given k makes it more likely that he will
actually be made worse off if he buys the policy.
Suppose, as seems likely, that the consumers cannot judge the level
of s very well, nor can they compare one company's chance of insolvency
to that of another. The thing that is easy to compare is the premium
that each company will charge to assume the risk. With other things
equal, the lower the "loading" the greater the probability of insolvency.
If consumers cannot distinguish one company from another in terms
of solvency, and so choose their policies on the basis of premium alone,
then the insolvency-prone companies will drive out the more solidComment on Munch and Smallwood 177
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companies. Of course, as consumers learn that there is a significant
chance of insolvency they will simply stop buying insurance policies.
Thus, the end result is the destruction of the entire market. This story is
similar, if not identical, to George Akerlof's "market for lemons" ("The
Market for Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanism,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics LXXIV[1970] : 488-500).
From this point of view, the benefits of solvency regulation cannot be
measured merely in terms of reduced insolvency rates. The main benefits
are in the increased size of the market which is made possible by the
policyholders' belief that insolvencies either won't occur or that, if they
do, the policyholders will not be hurt.
I have not made a detailed study of the history of life-insurance solvency
regulations, but what little I know of it is consistent with the "lemon"
theory of insolvency regulation. In the 1840s the life insurance industry
began to grow very rapidly with the successful introduction of the
"mutual" policy and the beginnings of the agency system (see J. O.Lynch 178
Stalson, Marketing Life Insurance: Its History in America, revised edition
[Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1969], pp. 217-236 and 292-326). Success
attracted new entrants, some of whom began to offer "dividends" (paid
in scrip, not cash) amounting to 70-80 percent of the annual premium.
Agents for company A would suggest that company B was offering
dividends far in excess of what they could really pay. The claims gained
credence when some companies failed in the 1850s. As Stalson puts it
(p. 226),
The suspicion of all companies which these competitive assaults on
individual companies engendered, however, unquestionably did every
company more harm that it did any individual agent or company good.
It was about this same time (the early 1850s) that the states began to
impose minimum capital requirements on life insurance companies and
the first reserve-valuation laws were passed.
If the "lemon" theory of solvency regulation has much truth in it
then it will be very difficult to assess regulation's benefits. One would
have to estimate what the size of the market would have been in the
absence of regulation. I doubt that this can be done, though it may be
worthwhile to see whether differences in solvency regulations among the
states result in any detectable differences in the size of their markets.
But I don't think the interesting policy questions concern whether or
not solvency regulations should be eliminated. Neither industry nor
consumers appear to be pushing for their removal. Rather, I think the
interesting policy questions concern whether the methods that have been
adopted to achieve a given probability of insolvency are low-cost ways
of doing so, and how one would go about deciding on an appropriate
insolvency rate.
The first question, the relationship between paid-in capital (K), the
premium "loading" (k), and the probability of insolvency or "ruin" (S),
has been the subject of a great number of theoretical articles under the
general title of "collective risk theory," and a much smaller number of
empirical studies. (For a general review of these see Seal, Stochastic
Theory of Risk Business [New York: Wiley, 1969], chapters 4 and 5, and
K. Borch, The Mathematical Theory of Insurance [Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1974], parts III and IV.) The theoretical literature
provides, under some simplifying assumptions, some fairly tractable
closed-form analytical expressions for the function s = g(k,K).
Some insight may be gained into the second question, the appropriate
level for an insolvency rate, by exploring further the simple example
I gave to illustrate the workings of the lemon principle. The rationalComment on Munch and Smallwood 179
regulator (a species at least as rare as the rational economic man) might
reason as follows: For any given insolvency rate(s), I can use the technique
illustrated in the figure to compute the "certainty equivalent" level of
wealth for each policyholder. I can change s by requiring companies to
change the "loading" they built into their rates or by changing the
minimum capital requirement. What "loading" and minimum capital
requirement should I require, if I want to maximize the sum of the
policyholder's wealth certainty equivalents? The answer to this question
could be found by solving the following maximization problem:
Max £ [UiWi - P)(l - s) + U(Wt - P - C)(s)],
k,K i=l
where
s = g(k,K)andP = f(k,K).
In solving this problem, the regulator could look explicitly at the
tradeoff between increasing solvency and decreasing the premium. Note
that the expected utility hypothesis is being used for a "normative,"
rational policy purpose, rather than for a "positive" purpose, such as
to predict the way people actually behave.
Summary
I have suggested
• that solvency regulations in the life insurance industry deserve at least
as much attention as those in the property and casualty lines,
• that Munch and Smallwood should look to Akerlof's "market for
lemons" for a theoretical framework, rather than to the CAPM, and
• that the focus for policy research should be on the tradeoff between
lower premium rates and lower insolvency rates, rather than on whether
there should be any solvency regulations at all.
The views expressed in this comment are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the FTC or any of its other staff members.